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Abstract
Using a survey data from Bangladesh, this paper employs a simple de-
composition method to investigate the possible role of inequality in hus-
band and wife’s portfolio holdings to various intrahousehold issues. Re-
sults indicate that wives’ intrahousehold environments are affected more
by their portfolio than by their husband’s asset and income holdings.
Wives who have inherited plots from their parents-in-law appear to be-
long to the better off group as well.
1 INTRODUCTION
Households being composed of different people with different preferences and
opinions1 have been recognized as far back as the early 1970’s2 but recent years
have seen an influx of theoretical and empirical proofs that indeed unitary frame-
work may be inadequate to model household behavior. Within the labour sup-
ply context, studies which have conveyed that household outcomes warrant a
framework that recognizes preference heterogeneity among household members
include Seaton (1997, 2001), Barmby and Smith (2001) and Chiappori, Fortin
and Lacroix (2002). While they differ in methods, these studies make room
for bargaining between couples and hence point, either directly or indirectly, to
the crucial role of intrahousehold power. In the household expenditures con-
text, Quisumbing and Maluccio (2003) have explored individually controlled
resources as intrahousehold power indicator and found evidence that has vali-
dated its role and hence the collective household framework.
Based on the findings of the studies above, the present research takes as given
the preference heterogeneity among household members. With this assumption,
the paper attempts to contribute to the literature by investigating the extent
and sources of inequality in assets and incomes, referred to as portfolio hereafter,
within the context of intrahousehold issues. Consequently, this line of research
attempts to enrich the household literature by 1) exploring other methods to an-
alyze intrahousehold outcomes and 2) extending the analysis to sensitive issues
such as domestic violence and wives’ financial autonomy, mobility and decision
making participation. This is accomplished by employing the Stark, Taylor and
Yitzhaki (1986) decomposition method.
2 DATA AND DECOMPOSITION METHOD
To integrate the research objectives to the decomposition method, data and
definitions are presented first. The data used has been collected by the Inter-
national Food and Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) in Bangladesh from June
1
1996 to September 1997 in four-month intervals to evaluate the impact of agri-
cultural dissemination programs.3 Nevertheless, the survey has collected not
only the information relevant to the program but also to the current objective.
There is a module devoted to very detailed information on pre-marriage assets,
gifts at marriage and current assets such as plot ownership, durable assets and
nonlabor incomes. All the asset values are reported in 1996 Taka.
In its fourth round, the survey has also collected information on issues ranging
from household expenditure decisions to violence, mobility and autonomy with
the wives as respondents. This portion of the interview has been conducted as
much as possible without the presence of other household members. There are
four intrahousehold environments considered each having two groups: mobility,
financial autonomy, participation in household expenditures decisions and mar-
ital abuse. Wives who belong to group one are presumed to have less favorable
intrahousehold environment relative to their counterparts in group two.
Before proceeding, some definition is in order. A wife is presumed to have mo-
bility when she has indicated that there has been no instance during the year
prior to the interview when she could not visit her kin because of too much work
or husband’s disapproval. She has financial autonomy when she has declared
that no one from the household has taken her money against her will. She is
also presumed to have decision-making capacity when she has either bought
major livestock or leased land without consulting anybody or her husband has
done so after obtaining her opinion. Absence of marital abuse is defined as no
one from among the household members has verbally and physically assaulted
her. Following Quisumbing and de la Brie`re (2000), the samples analyzed are
limited to monogamous households.
The decomposition method used has been applied in the decomposition of village
remittances (Stark, Taylor and Yitzhaki, 1986) and household incomes (Lerman
and Yitzhaki, 1985). The innovation introduced in the present research is its
application to the decomposition of husbands and wives’ portfolios within the
context of intrahousehold issues. This, to our knowledge, has not yet been done
by studies concerned with the effects of individually controlled resources to in-
trahousehold outcomes.
Briefly, let Ak be the individual’s kth asset holding. Lerman and Yitzhaki (1985)
have shown that the Gini coefficient of total portfolio for a certain group may
be written as
G0 =
2cov[A0, F (A0)]
µ0
(1)
where µ0 is the group mean portfolio and F (A0) is the cumulative distribution
of total portfolios for that group. Further, equation 1 can be expressed as
G0 =
K∑
k=1
2cov[Ak, F (Ak)]
µk
Ak
A0
cov[Ak, F (A0)]
cov[Ak, F (Ak)]
(2)
=
K∑
k=1
GkSkRk (3)
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where Gk is the Gini index of asset k, Sk is the share of asset k to the total
portfolio and Rk is the Gini correlation of asset k to the total portfolio. Hence,
this simple method permits the analysis of the following questions for each of the
intrahousehold environments defined above: 1) For each group, which among
the portfolio sources contribute to the total inequality of portfolio holdings?
2) Among the sources with substantial contribution to total inequality, which
among the G, S and R are actually causing the overall inequality and 3) Are
there any patterns in the G, S and R that can be observed from group one to
group two?
3 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Decomposition for both husbands and wives’ portfolio in each group are pre-
sented in table 1. It can be observed that for group two, the overall Gini
coefficient (G0) of wives’ portfolio is higher than that of the husbands’ in all of
the four environments considered. The reverse can be observed for husbands
and wives who belong to group one. Among the portfolio sources, plot value has
substantial contributions to the overall Gini coefficient for both husbands and
wives in each group. Gifts at marriage and durable assets also have discernible
impact on the overall Gini coefficient concerning wives’ portfolio.
Table 1 reveals that wives’ plot ownership exhibits high inequality between
groups with Gini index not lower than .90 while that of the husbands’ is sub-
stantially lower. Results also indicate that the G, S and R of husbands’ plot
ownership show minimal changes from group one to group two in all the in-
trahousehold environments considered except for domestic violence. However
results on wives’ plot ownership indicate different patterns. While the G and R
exhibit minimal variations in either group, wives in group two appear to have
plot ownership share substantially higher than those in group one. Taken to-
gether, these observations indicate that 1) Wives’ intrahousehold environment
are affected more by their portfolio than by their husbands’ asset and income
holdings and 2) Higher plot values under the wives’ control grant them better
intrahousehold environments.
Decomposition of plot ownership’s Gini index by source is presented in table 2.
Result shows that the share of purchased plots to the total portfolio substan-
tially accounts for wives’ Gplots. In addition, wives in group two have purchased
plot share higher than those in group one in mobility and wives’ financial au-
tonomy. This indicates that wives’ financial capability translates to favorable
intrahousehold environments, a result which is in line with the findings of the
studies above. Government policies aimed at women empowerment can there-
fore look into designing ways to assist women acquire land properties.
In addition, wives in group one have less or no plots inherited from their parents-
in-law in all the environments considered. While we cannot be sure that this
inheritance is part of the bride price,4 it does reflect the value attached by the
husbands’ families to their daughters-in-law, which is in part resonated to the
wives’ intrahousehold environment.
3
Notes
1This line of reasoning incorporates what is central to micro approaches: methodological
individualism. See Arrow (1994) for an elaborate exposition on this concept.
2See for example Becker (1973).
3See Quisumbing and de la Brie`re for comprehensive survey and data description.
4Also known as Khailoti, an amount paid to the bride’s father. In recent years however,
bride price has been replaced by dowry, an amount paid to the groom instead.
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Table 1: Portfolio Decomposition
Husbands Wives
G S R G*S*R G S R G*S*R
Mobility
Group 1: Less Mobile
Pre-Marriage Assets 0.86 0.00 0.30 0.00 0.80 0.06 0.63 0.03
Gifts at Marriage 0.73 0.01 -0.11 0.00 0.59 0.43 0.82 0.21
Durable Assets 0.88 0.03 0.70 0.02 0.77 0.13 0.66 0.07
Plot Ownership 0.66 0.95 1.00 0.63 0.98 0.30 1.00 0.29
Proceeds from Livestock Sale 0.86 0.00 0.26 0.00 0.75 0.06 0.28 0.01
Nonlabor Incomes 0.90 0.01 0.29 0.00 0.92 0.01 0.48 0.01
G0 0.64 0.62
Number of Observations 306
Group 2: More Mobile
Pre-Marriage Assets 0.84 0.00 -0.05 0.00 0.77 0.03 0.57 0.01
Gifts at Marriage 0.76 0.01 -0.06 0.00 0.58 0.16 0.70 0.06
Durable Assets 0.76 0.03 0.57 0.01 0.71 0.12 0.76 0.06
Plot Ownership 0.63 0.95 1.00 0.59 0.99 0.65 1.00 0.64
Proceeds from Livestock Sale 0.79 0.01 0.39 0.00 0.76 0.03 0.34 0.01
Nonlabor Incomes 0.89 0.01 0.47 0.00 0.96 0.02 0.74 0.01
G0 0.61 0.80
Number of Observations 405
Financial Autonomy
Group 1: Money Taken Against Her Will
Pre-Marriage Assets 0.82 0.00 0.42 0.00 0.81 0.07 0.60 0.03
Gifts at Marriage 0.76 0.01 -0.07 0.00 0.67 0.41 0.81 0.22
Durable Assets 0.90 0.02 0.57 0.01 0.72 0.21 0.70 0.11
Plot Ownership 0.64 0.96 1.00 0.61 0.98 0.19 0.98 0.18
Proceeds from Livestock Sale 0.91 0.00 0.30 0.00 0.71 0.10 0.23 0.02
Nonlabor Incomes 0.91 0.01 0.69 0.00 0.96 0.02 0.66 0.01
G0 0.63 0.57
Number of Observations 145
Group 2: Money Not Taken Against Her Will
Pre-Marriage Assets 0.86 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.79 0.05 0.57 0.02
Gifts at Marriage 0.73 0.01 -0.12 0.00 0.58 0.33 0.76 0.15
Durable Assets 0.80 0.03 0.62 0.01 0.75 0.16 0.72 0.09
Plot Ownership 0.63 0.95 1.00 0.60 0.97 0.38 0.99 0.36
Proceeds from Livestock Sale 0.81 0.00 0.38 0.00 0.75 0.05 0.33 0.01
Nonlabor Incomes 0.89 0.01 0.35 0.00 0.95 0.02 0.68 0.02
G0 0.61 0.65
Number of Observations 574
Domestic Violence
Group 1: Abusive Marital Relations
Pre-Marriage Assets 0.83 0.01 0.24 0.00 0.78 0.06 0.54 0.02
Gifts at Marriage 0.72 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.58 0.40 0.80 0.19
Durable Assets 0.86 0.03 0.71 0.02 0.75 0.14 0.71 0.08
Plot Ownership 0.70 0.94 1.00 0.66 0.98 0.33 0.99 0.32
Proceeds from Livestock Sale 0.88 0.00 0.33 0.00 0.76 0.05 0.29 0.01
Nonlabor Incomes 0.94 0.01 0.37 0.00 0.93 0.02 0.46 0.01
G0 0.68 0.63
Number of Observations 234
6
Group 2: Non-Abusive Marital Relations
Pre-Marriage Assets 0.88 0.00 -0.10 0.00 0.82 0.05 0.62 0.02
Gifts at Marriage 0.78 0.01 -0.19 0.00 0.62 0.27 0.72 0.12
Durable Assets 0.77 0.03 0.60 0.01 0.74 0.19 0.73 0.10
Plot Ownership 0.63 0.95 1.00 0.60 0.96 0.43 0.99 0.40
Proceeds from Livestock Sale 0.80 0.00 0.38 0.00 0.77 0.05 0.36 0.01
Nonlabor Incomes 0.85 0.01 0.32 0.00 0.94 0.02 0.60 0.01
G0 0.62 0.68
Number of Observations 247
Decision Making Participation
Group 1: Non-Participant Wives
Pre-Marriage Assets 0.79 0.01 -0.45 0.00 0.78 0.07 0.57 0.03
Gifts at Marriage 0.79 0.01 -0.24 0.00 0.55 0.35 0.71 0.14
Durable Assets 0.70 0.03 0.38 0.01 0.63 0.23 0.66 0.09
Plot Ownership 0.57 0.95 1.00 0.53 0.94 0.30 0.99 0.28
Proceeds from Livestock Sale 0.72 0.01 0.43 0.00 0.76 0.05 0.55 0.02
Nonlabor Incomes 0.85 0.01 0.28 0.00 0.78 0.00 0.24 0.00
G0 0.54 0.56
Number of Observations 64
Group 2: Participant Wives
Pre-Marriage Assets 0.83 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.75 0.04 0.44 0.01
Gifts at Marriage 0.64 0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.58 0.19 0.53 0.06
Durable Assets 0.86 0.02 0.57 0.01 0.64 0.16 0.55 0.06
Plot Ownership 0.58 0.96 1.00 0.56 0.97 0.53 0.99 0.50
Proceeds from Livestock Sale 0.76 0.00 0.22 0.00 0.71 0.05 0.07 0.00
Nonlabor Incomes 0.88 0.01 0.64 0.01 0.96 0.03 0.76 0.02
G0 0.57 0.66
Number of Observations 75
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Table 2: Plot Ownership Gini Decomposition, by Source
Husbands Wives
G S R G*S*R G S R G*S*R
Mobility
Group 1: Less Mobile
Purchased 0.82 0.38 0.85 0.27 0.98 0.77 1.00 0.76
Inherited from Parents-In-Law 0.99 0.00 0.27 0.00 0.99 0.14 0.97 0.13
Inherited from Parents 0.71 0.61 0.91 0.40 0.99 0.09 0.95 0.08
Gplots 0.66 0.98
Group 2: More Mobile
Purchased 0.78 0.36 0.82 0.23 0.99 0.79 1.00 0.78
Inherited from Parents-In-Law 0.99 0.01 0.79 0.01 1.00 0.05 0.98 0.05
Inherited from Parents 0.68 0.63 0.91 0.39 0.99 0.16 0.98 0.16
Gplots 0.63 0.99
Wives’ Financial Autonomy
Group 1: Money Taken Against Her Will
Purchased 0.79 0.39 0.83 0.26 0.99 0.46 0.99 0.45
Inherited from Parents-In-Law 0.99 0.01 0.79 0.01
Inherited from Parents 0.70 0.59 0.88 0.37 0.99 0.54 1.00 0.54
Gplots 0.64 0.99
Group 2: Money Not Taken Against Her Will
Purchased 0.79 0.37 0.83 0.24 0.98 0.53 0.99 0.51
Inherited from Parents-In-Law 0.99 0.01 0.67 0.01 0.99 0.13 0.96 0.12
Inherited from Parents 0.68 0.62 0.90 0.38 0.99 0.34 0.99 0.33
Gplots 0.63 0.97
Domestic Violence
Group 1: Abusive Marital Relations
Purchased 0.84 0.39 0.87 0.28 0.98 0.80 1.00 0.78
Inherited from Parents-In-Law 0.99 0.00 0.52 0.00
Inherited from Parents 0.74 0.61 0.92 0.42 0.99 0.20 0.96 0.19
Gplots 0.70 0.98
Group 2: Non-Abusive Marital Relations
Purchased 0.78 0.37 0.83 0.24 0.97 0.63 0.98 0.61
Inherited from Parents-In-Law 0.99 0.01 0.77 0.01 0.99 0.08 0.95 0.08
Inherited from Parents 0.68 0.62 0.91 0.39 0.99 0.28 0.98 0.27
Gplots 0.63 0.96
Decision Making Participation
Group 1: Non-Participant Wives
Purchased 0.68 0.44 0.85 0.25 0.94 1.00 1.00 0.94
Inherited from Parents 0.62 0.56 0.91 0.31
Gplots 0.57 0.94
Group 2: Participant Wives
Purchased 0.75 0.40 0.81 0.24 0.98 0.40 0.97 0.38
Inherited from Parents-In-Law 0.99 0.04 0.92 0.04
Inherited from Parents 0.66 0.60 0.85 0.34 0.99 0.56 1.00 0.55
Gplots 0.58 0.97
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